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LIMITING EXECUTIVE BRANCH JUDO IN
FEDERAL STEM CELL RESEARCH
POLICIES AND REGULATIONS
Andrew Lau*
Human embryonic stem cell research has tremendous potential for
treating or curing many diseases that cause human suffering.
Nevertheless, federal funding for stem cell research has had a
controversial history in the United States. While many Americans
believe that stem cell research will lead to the development of critical
medical technology, others oppose it because of its association with
abortion. These ethical issues have made stem cell research a prime
target for political posturing, particularly because of how much power
presidents have over stem cell research policies. By using vetoes,
directives, or executive orders to manipulate stem cell policies,
presidents have engaged in executive branch judo to work around the
separation of powers and engage in unauthorized lawmaking activity at
the expense of the public.
This note will analyze the history of the United States’ stem cell
research policies and explain how presidents have interfered with its
development. Based on the principles of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, presidents have repeatedly manipulated stem cell policies in
violation of the Constitution. In light of these violations, this note
proposes several methods to curtail the president’s unilateral control
over an entire field of scientific research. Human embryonic stem cell
research represents the next frontier of biomedical science, but its
benefits will only reach the American public if the United States puts an
end to the presidential practice of using executive branch judo to
manipulate it.

* J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 2022. Senior Articles Editor, SANTA
CLARA LAW REVIEW, Volume 62.

647

648

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .............................................................................649
II. Background..............................................................................650
A. 1973-1980: Roe v. Wade and the Early Origins
of America’s Stem Cell Policy ........................................650
B. 1980-1988: The Reagan Administration and
Stem Cells in Fetal Tissue Research ................................ 652
C. 1988-1992: President George H. W. Bush
and Changing Public Sentiment ....................................... 654
D. 1992-2000: The Clinton Administration and
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment .......................................659
E. 2000-2008: President George W. Bush and
the Decentralized “Compromise” Policy .........................662
F. 2008-2016: President Obama and The Stem
Cell Policy Shift ..............................................................665
III. Identification of the Legal Problem .........................................668
IV. Analysis ...................................................................................668
A. Evaluating the President’s Authority to
Make Stem Cell Research Policies...................................669
1. President Reagan ........................................................671
2. President George H. W. Bush.....................................672
3. President Clinton ........................................................ 673
4. President George W. Bush .........................................674
5. President Obama.........................................................675
6. President Trump .........................................................675
B. The Effects of President’s Policymaking
Authority Over Stem Cell Research ................................. 676
1. Discouraging Research and Development ..................676
2. Contribution to Patent Monopolies.............................678
3. Unpredictability Contributes to a Disorganized
Regulatory Framework for Stem Cell
Discoveries and Therapeutics .....................................678
V. Proposal ...................................................................................679
A. Rewrite the Dickey-Wicker Amendment
Clarify Federal Funding Protocols ...................................679
B. Involve the Public in the Policymaking Process ..............680
C. Establishing an Independent Commission
for Research Policymaking .............................................. 681
VI. Conclusion ...............................................................................682

2022]

LIMITING EXECUTIVE BRANCH JUDO

649

I. INTRODUCTION
Human embryonic stem cells possess the unique ability to turn into
all the different cells of the human body.1 Given their properties, human
embryonic stem cells have become a promising area for creating novel
medical therapies for a wide variety of diseases.2 From cancer to
diabetes, almost all the world’s untreatable diseases can potentially
become curable through human embryonic stem cell research.3
However, United States stem cell researchers have often found it
challenging to conduct research on human embryonic stem cells because
of America’s inconsistent stem cell research policy. Since a large
proportion of stem cell research utilizes human embryonic stem cells
derived from early-stage embryos, portions of the American public
strongly oppose federal support for stem cell research.4 Proponents
believe that stem cell research will contribute to the development of new,
life-saving medical therapies.5 On the other hand, opponents believe that
stem cell research constitutes an unethical scientific pursuit because of
its association with human embryonic stem cells (“hESCs”).6 This
public opposition has prevented the United States from adopting a
uniform policy for guiding United States stem cell research. As a result,
the United States has developed a fragmented funding system for stem
cell research that inhibits the development of medical sciences and risks
putting the United States behind the international race towards modern
medicine.7
The problems with the nation’s stem cell research policies can
largely be attributed to the broad discretion Presidents have over stem
cell policies. The controversial nature of stem cell research makes the
field a target for political posturing, and Presidents have readily utilized
their executive power to pursue diverging stem cell policies to achieve
their own aims. While Presidents are not prohibited from pursuing
political goals through executive power, the degree to which Presidents
have done so is alarming. Using executive-branch judo—meaning a
combination of vetoes, directives, and executive orders—to work around

1. John A. Robertson, Embryo Stem Cell Research: Ten Years of Controversy, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 191, 192 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 198.
4. Dorothy C. Wertz, Embryo and Stem Cell Research in the United States: History and
Politics, GENE THERAPY 674, 676 (2002).
5. Robertson, supra note 1, at 192.
6. Id.
7. Robertson, supra note 1, at 192.
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the law, presidents have engaged in unauthorized policymaking activity
at the expense of the public.8
If the United States wants to promote the next frontier of medical
therapies, Congress must change federal research funding laws or create
an independent committee for stem cell regulations. This note will focus
on this issue by first discussing the origins of the public debate over stem
cell research in the United States. It will then identify the structural
problems of the current United States stem cell policy. This note will
then conclude by describing solutions that could potentially redress the
current state of United States research policies towards stem cell
research and future life sciences research.
II. BACKGROUND
America’s inconsistent stem cell policy has its roots in America’s
controversial debate over abortion and embryo status.9 Fully addressing
the current issues of America’s stem cell policy requires a discussion of
their origins. This section will discuss how the Roe v. Wade10 antiabortion movement initiated the debate over fetal tissue research in the
United States. It will then discuss how different presidents have
addressed the fetal tissue research controversy. The section will
conclude by discussing how the combined actions of the executive and
legislative branches contributed to the current disjointed American stem
cell policy.
A. 1973-1980: Roe v. Wade and the Early Origins of America’s Stem
Cell Policy
American stem cell policy has intricate ties with the debate over
elective abortion. The debate began in 1973 when the Supreme Court
legalized elective abortion through its landmark decision in Roe v.

8. Executive branch judo is an original term coined by the author of this article to
analogize use of executive power to Judo—”an art of weaponless self-defense developed in
China and Japan that uses throws, holds and blows, and derives added power from the
attacker’s own weight and strength.” Principles of Judo have similarly been analogized in
other contexts, such as in the term “corporate-judo” which means that a company has taken
“. . .advantage of a competitor’s inevitable weaknesses when it mergers, acquires, downsizes,
or restructures.” Bastien et al., Corporate Judo; Exploiting the Dark Side of Change; When
Competitors Merge, Acquire, Downsize, or Restructure, 1 J. of Mgmt. Inquiry n.3, 261, 26263.
9. Robertson, supra note 1, at 192.
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). At the time this note was written, the Supreme
Court still recognized Roe v. Wade. It has since overturned Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).
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Wade.11 Discontent with the Supreme Court’s decision, a large and
politically active United States anti-abortion movement quickly
formed.12 While the movement primarily focused on reversing Roe v.
Wade, it also stopped all research involving human embryos or fetal
tissue derived from elective abortions.13
The heavy political pressure exerted by the anti-abortion movement
spurred Congress to begin creating a system for adopting federal
regulations on fetal tissue and embryo research.14 In 1974, Congress
established the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (“NC”) to provide
recommendations on regulating fetal tissue and embryo
experimentation.15 That same year, the newly established NC released
its first recommendations for what ethical guidelines should apply to
fetal tissue and embryo research.16 The NC recommendation requested
Congress to form a national Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”).17 Under
the NC guidelines, the proposed EAB would review the acceptability of
embryo and fetal tissue research projects that sought funding from the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).18 After receiving
the EAB’s advice, the HHS would then have the power to decide whether
to provide the research project with federal funding.19
In 1975, the HHS officially adopted the NC’s recommended ethical
guidelines for fetal and embryo research.20 However, Congress took no
action on the NC’s recommendation to create an EAB.21 The lack of
action restricted the HHS from disbursing federal funds for embryo or
fetal tissue research projects because the NC guidelines adopted by the
HHS required the non-existent EAB to review the proposed project
first.22 It would take Congress until 1979 to finally create the EAB as a
part of the National Institute of Health (“NIH”).23 However, the HHS
immediately rejected funding for the first project approved by the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Wertz, supra note 4, at 676.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ann A. Kiessling, What Is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1073 (2004).
Wertz, supra note 4, at 674.
Id.
Id.
Kiessling, supra note 15, at 1073.
Wertz, supra note 4, at 674.
Kiessling, supra note 15, at 1073.
Id.
Id.
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EAB.24 By 1980, the EAB had run out of funding and its charter expired,
leaving no administrative body to approve embryo research protocols.25
B. 1980-1988: The Reagan Administration and Stem Cells in Fetal
Tissue Research
Following the 1980 dissolution of the EAB, President Reagan’s
HHS would continue to withhold funds from projects that involved fetal
tissue from elective abortions.26 The anti-abortion movement had
strongly supported President Reagan’s election campaigns and played a
significant role in the President’s two successive terms.27 President
Reagan’s campaign ran on a strong anti-fetal tissue research platform.28
During his election, President Reagan had even made a campaign
promise to restrict federally funded fetal tissue research during his
presidency.29 Despite this promise, the HHS still funded a substantial
number of stem cell-related fetal tissue research projects during
President Reagan’s two terms.30 While projects on tissue from elective
abortions did not receive HHS funding, the department would continue
to fund fetal tissue research on tissue from sources other than elective
abortions.31 Nevertheless, President Reagan would take a stronger
stance against fetal tissue research in his final years in office.32

24. Wertz, supra note 4, at 674.
25. Id.
26. Robin Alta Charo,”La Pénible Valse Hésitation”: Fetal Tissue Research Review and
the Use of Bioethics Commissions in France and the United States, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES:
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 477, 481 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al.
eds., 1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. (describing how the anti-abortion movement “had expanded the scope of their
efforts to include a number of collateral issues,” such as the regulation of in-vitro fertilization
and mandating contraception for female child abusers).
29. Id.
30. See Dorothy E. Vawter, Fetal Tissue Transplantation Policy in the United States, 12
POL. & LIFE SCI. 79, 80 (1993) (explaining how research on fetal tissue not derived from
elective abortions received federal funding before, and during the 1980s).
31. “Federal funding of fetal tissue transplantation research in humans has always been
permitted provided that the tissue is obtained from fetuses that died of causes other than
elective abortion.” Id. at 79. In the 1950s, the National Institute of Health (NIH) began
supporting fetal tissue research on tissue obtained from elective abortions as well. Id. The
polio vaccine was developed through this federally funded fetal tissue research. Id.; see also
Meredith Wadman, Cell Division, 498 NATURE 422, 422-24 (2013),
https://www.nature.com/articles/498422a.pdf (discussing the use of fetal tissue cells in the
research and development of vaccines for polio, rubella, rabies, measles, chickenpox, and
shingles).
32. See Kiessling, supra note 15, at 1074 (explaining how embryo related research
projects submitted to the NIH would often go through the grant approval process without any
hope for final approval because no EAB existed to review the projects).
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In 1987, an NIH researcher sought federal funding for a project that
involved the transplantation of fetal neural tissue into the brain of a
Parkinson’s disease patient.33 When the NIH received the project
proposal, it reviewed the proposal and approved the study.34 However,
the Director of the NIH, James Wyngaarden, then did something highly
unusual for the NIH: he reached out to the Assistant Secretary of Health,
Robert Windom, for advice regarding the ethics of funding fetal tissue
research projects.35
Windom responded on March 22, 1988, by requesting the NIH to
form a special advisory panel to discuss whether fetal tissue
transplantation experiments would affect the rate of elective abortions.36
Until the NIH panel issued its decision, Windom would impose a
moratorium on all federal funding for fetal tissue transplant experiments
that involved tissue from elective abortions.37 Per Windom’s request,
the NIH formed a twenty-five-member panel of scientists, doctors,
religious leaders, and anti-abortion activists to answer the Windom
question.38 However, the NIH panel’s role in deciding the Windom
question quickly became moot.39
In the first instance of executive branch judo to control stem cell
research policy, the Reagan Administration disclosed a draft of an
executive order to the press a week before the NIH panel began its
inquiry.40 In the leaked executive order, the Reagan Administration
revealed that President Reagan had already planned on unilaterally
banning all fetal tissue experiments, regardless of where the fetal tissue
came from.41 The news indicated that even if the NIH panel decided to
provide federal funding for all fetal tissue research, the President would
likely ignore its recommendation.42 The news of the leak did not surprise
many because of the President’s alignment with the anti-abortion
movement.43 After all, President Reagan had even issued a statement

33. Vawter, supra note 30, at 80.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Wertz, supra note 4, at 675; Charo, supra note 26, at 482.
37. Vawter, supra note 30, at 80-81.
38. See Charo, supra note 26, at 482 (describing the composition of the panel).
39. See generally id. at 481 (explaining how the NIH panel only served in an advisory
capacity and that the Reagan Administration would likely not follow its decision because of
its public stance against federally funding fetal tissue research).
40. Id. at 482.
41. Id.
42. Id. (“From the beginning, then, the efforts of this national panel to provide
dispassionate advice leading to a consensus on research regulations had a bit of a farcical
quality . . . .”).
43. See id.
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that he would restrict funding for fetal tissue research in his last few
years in office.44
Nevertheless, the NIH panel proceeded with their inquiry.45 By
December of 1988, the panel reached its decision and conveyed its
findings to Assistant Secretary Windom.46 By an eighteen to three
majority, the NIH panel stated two primary conclusions.47 First, the NIH
panel concluded that fetal tissue transplantation experiments would not
incentivize women to obtain elective abortions if the federal government
enacted procedural guidelines for fetal tissue donation from the medical
procedure.48 Second, the NIH panel concluded that the executive branch
should remove Windom’s moratorium on fetal tissue research because
no evidence suggested that the research would contribute to a rise in
elective abortion rates.49 However, President Reagan made good on his
promise to his anti-abortion constituency and wholly ignored the panel’s
recommendations.50 Although he never officially issued the leaked
executive order to withhold federal funds from all fetal tissue research,
President Reagan would neither implement the NIH panel’s
recommended guidelines nor lift Windom’s research moratorium for the
remainder of his presidency.51
C. 1988-1992: President George H. W. Bush and Changing Public
Sentiment
Towards the end of President Reagan’s second term, public opinion
towards fetal tissue research began to change.52 George H. W. Bush
(“President Bush Sr.”), President Reagan’s former Vice President,

44. See Charo, supra note 26, at 481 (explaining that in 1987, President Reagan had also
issued a statement through his White House staff that all fetal tissue research would no longer
receive federal funding without further review).
45. See id. (explaining that the inquiry would become dominated by the discussion of
abortion rather than the scientific value and ethics of fetal tissue research).
46. Vawter, supra note 30, at 81.
47. Charo, supra note 26, at 483.
48. Vawter, supra note 30, at 81 (listing the NIH panel’s three guidelines that should
regulate the donation of fetal tissue from elective abortions to medical research).
49. See Charo, supra note 26, at 482-84 (summarizing the panel’s conclusion that the
federal government should not conflate fetal tissue transplantation experiments with the issue
of abortion and that no evidence existed to suggest that such experiments had increased
elective abortion rates in other countries).
50. Vawter, supra note 30, at 81.
51. See id. (summarizing how the Reagan Administration took no action on the panel’s
recommendation); see also Charo, supra note 26, at 483 (stating that the Reagan
Administration ignored the panel’s recommendation to lift the research moratorium).
52. See Charo, supra note 26, at 484-85 (discussing the emergence of various fetal tissue
research advocacy groups and expert opinions).
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would succeed President Reagan with support from his predecessor’s
anti-abortion constituency, which continued to have a strong political
presence throughout the country.53 However, a growing number of
patient-consumers and provider-advocates had begun to sway the
public’s opinion towards the Windom moratorium on research that used
tissue derived from elective abortions.54 President Bush Sr.’s actions in
response to these changes in public opinion eventually exposed a
separation of powers issue over research policymaking decisions in the
United States.55
After his election, President Bush Sr. quickly established himself
as an opponent of fetal tissue research.56 Within months of President
Bush Sr.’s election, the new Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Louis Sullivan, issued a statement that would set the tone for the Bush
Administration’s fetal tissue research policy.57 In his statement, Sullivan
rebuked the findings of the Reagan-era NIH panel and argued that
funding research on aborted fetal tissue would incentivize elective
abortions and increase its frequency.58 Although the Bush Sr.
Administration could not provide any evidence to counter the NIH
panel’s opposite conclusion, it extended the Windom moratorium
indefinitely.59
The executive branch’s decision to indefinitely extend the
moratorium represented another instance of executive branch judo that
left both proponents and opponents of stem cell research dissatisfied.60
Some critics believed that the Bush Sr. Administration had illegally
extended the moratorium because it had not followed the procedures for
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).61
According to the APA, the Bush Sr. Administration should have

53. See id.
54. See id. at 485.
55. Helen M. Maroney, Bioethical Catch-22: The Moratorium on Federal Funding of
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research and the NIH Revitalization Amendments, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 485, 497 (1993).
56. Charo, supra note 26, at 485.
57. Vawter, supra note 30, at 81.
58. See id. (summarizing the NIH panel’s decades of evidence that indicate that no
woman has reportedly aborted her fetus for the purpose of donating its tissue to research).
59. Id. (addressing the 1989 extension of Windom’s moratorium on fetal tissue research,
which the former Assistant Secretary of Health had issued in 1988).
60. See Vawter, supra note 30, at 83 (“[s]ome have charged that the Bush
administration’s ‘indefinite’ extension of the ban was illegal. . ..”); see also Charo, supra note
26, at 485 (discussing how proponents and opponents of stem cell research were both
dissatisfied with the federal government’s inability to reach a unified stance on whether the
country would support or oppose stem cell research).
61. Vawter, supra note 30, at 83.
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published a proposed rule for extending the moratorium in the Federal
Register and field public comment on the rule before issuing the
extension.62 Instead, Sullivan had simply announced that the ban would
continue indefinitely.63 Privately funded advocacy groups, such as the
National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (“NABER”) and the
American Medical Association (“AMA”), emerged as vocal proponents
for the government to end the executive branch’s unilateral decision to
extend the Windom moratorium.64 The political pressure exerted by
these groups spurred Congress to begin working on bipartisan bills that
would curtail the executive branch’s control over fetal tissue research
policies.65 However, President Bush repeatedly blocked Congress’s
efforts, resulting in policy conflicts between the legislative and executive
branches.66
The fetal tissue research conflict between Congress and the
President reached its peak near the end of President Bush Sr.’s first term
when he issued a controversial “diverting executive order” to undermine
a bipartisan fetal tissue bill.67 In May of 1992, Congress had passed a
bipartisan bill that would have permitted fetal tissue research funding
and limited the ability of executive branch officials to ban federal
funding for entire fields of research.68 Both Democrats and Republicans
believed that the bill’s language would not encourage women to obtain
abortions solely to donate the tissue to research.69 As expected,
President Bush Sr. vetoed the bill.70 However, it quickly became
apparent that the bill had enough votes in Congress to override the veto.71
President Bush Sr. responded by issuing a “diverting” executive order to
sway a few crucial votes against the Congressional override.72 The

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Charo, supra note 26, at 485.
65. See Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83 (describing how Congress passed a bipartisan
bill that “limited the authority of officials of the executive branch, such as the secretary of
HHS, to ban federal funds for an entire field of research without the support of an ethics
advisory board”).
66. See id. (discussing President Bush’s controversial diverting executive order that
prevented the passage of a bipartisan fetal tissue research bill between May and June of 1992).
67. See id.
68. Id. (explaining how the bill would have limited the executive branch authority to ban
federal funding for research without the support of an ethics advisory board).
69. Id.
70. Vawter, supra note 30, at 82.
71. Id.
72. Id. (“[w]hen it became clear that Congress was close to succeeding [at passing a
compromise bill], President Bush [Sr.] issued a diverting executive order that successfully
reclaimed a few crucial votes in the House.”).
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executive order “diverted” House votes by creating an alternative
solution to fetal tissue access—specifically, it would establish a fetal
tissue bank that provide researchers and patients with fetal tissue
collected from spontaneously aborted fetuses and ectopic pregnancies.73
The Bush Sr. Administration contended that this tissue bank could fully
support the needs of fetal tissue researchers and patients while
simultaneously avoiding the use of tissue from elective abortions.74 As
a result, the congressional bill lost the votes necessary to guarantee an
override because supporters no longer saw the bill as necessary.75
In June of 1992, Congress quickly came back with a compromise
bill that included the proposed tissue bank of President Bush Sr.’s
diverting executive order.76
The compromise bill gave the
administration a year to determine whether the fetal tissue bank would
work as the Bush Administration had proposed.77 After one year, any
researcher who could not timely obtain suitable tissue from the NIH
tissue bank would have the option of receiving the tissue from elective
abortions.78 However, President Bush Sr. subsequently failed to support
the compromise bill, retroactively casting his executive order in a
controversial light because it “suggested that the administration was less
than fully confident the fetal tissue bank would succeed.”79 In addition,
it “lent credence to the suspicion that establishing the tissue bank was a
diversion designed solely to appease the radical minority in the
Republican party who insisted on holding fetal tissue transplantation
hostage to abortion politics.”80 By the end of his first term, President
Bush Sr.’s diverting executive order had caused the compromise bill to
lose too much support, and a congressional filibuster would eventually
ensure that the bill did not reach the oval office for the remainder of
President Bush Sr.’s term.81
By the end of 1992, President Bush Sr.’s stance on fetal tissue
research became unpopular for two reasons. First, the President’s
actions had lost him congressional support because he had exposed a
separation of powers issue surrounding policymaking decisions for

73. Id.
74. See id. at 82-83 (explaining how the tissue bank could address the lack of usable
tissue for research).
75. See id.
76. Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83.
77. Id. at 82.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
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controversial research areas.82 The President’s use of executive orders
and vetoes to stall the passage of bipartisan bills caused many to consider
his actions unreasonable.83 Congress had become frustrated over the
President’s discouragement of bipartisan solutions to the fetal tissue
research issue and disliked how much control the President had over the
NIH’s funding actions.84
Additionally, the President had lost public support on the issue of
fetal tissue research because three factors had made the public more
receptive to plans for federally funding fetal tissue research during his
presidency.85 First, the moratorium had resulted in a lack of federal
regulation over privately funded fetal tissue research because it had
discouraged federal involvement in the field.86 Second, the moratorium
had drastically reduced United States fetal tissue transplantation research
progress compared to other countries.87 Lastly, doctors had actually
demonstrated that fetal tissue transplants could treat specific diseases,
which showed the public the promises of medical fetal tissue research
for the first time.88 Although these factors had changed the public’s
opinion on fetal tissue research, President Bush Sr. chose to remain
opposed to its funding.89 The President wanted to run for reelection, and
withholding federal funds from fetal tissue research could help garner

82. Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83.
83. See id. (describing how some members of President Bush’s party saw his actions as
an appeal to a small minority of anti-abortion voters).
84. See id.
85. See Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83.
86. To fill in the lack of federal guidance, many states began to apply the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) to the donation of fetal tissue. See id. This would lead to a wide
range of fetal tissue procurement and research practices because each state began to
implement different approaches for applying the UAGA. Id. at 83. For example, some states
would permit healthcare professionals to have full discretion over the use of fetal tissue from
aborted fetuses while other states merely required a healthcare professional to obtain verbal
consent at the time of the abortion. Id. at 83.
87. See id. at 82.
88. See id. (summarizing the highly publicized 1991 story of the Walden family’s
attempt to get a fetal tissue transplant for their unborn child in order to prevent the fetus from
dying of Hurler’s syndrome, a fatal genetic liver disease). Reverend Guy Walden, pastor of
the Broadway Baptist Church in Houston, and his wife, Terri Walden, held fervent antiabortion views. Steven Maynard-Moody, Managing Controversies over Science: The Case of
Fetal Research, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 15 (1995). However, after losing two
children to a genetic liver disease, the Waldens chose to take part in an experimental therapy
that utilized stem cells from fetal tissue. Id. The family would testify about their experience
with stem cell therapy and fetal tissue transplants to Congress in 1991. Id. at 16. Their
testimony “broke the hold that the antiabortion movement had held on fetal research for
twenty years,” leading to bipartisan support for federally funding fetal tissue research in the
last years of President Bush’s first term. Id.
89. Id.
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the support of anti-abortion movement voters in the 1992 Presidential
Election.90
D. 1992-2000: The Clinton Administration and the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment
President Bush Sr.’s reelection platform ultimately proved
ineffective when voters chose to replace him with Arkansas Governor
William Jefferson Clinton and a Democrat-leaning Congress.91
President Clinton characterized himself as a proponent of fetal and
embryonic tissue research, but his efforts to promote the field would
eventually become complicated by political concerns and legislative
hurdles.92 By the end of Clinton’s two terms, two significant pieces of
legislation would change the course of the United States’ stem cell
policy: the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 and
the 1996 Dickey-Wicker Amendment.93
On January 22, 1993, President Clinton issued an executive order
overturning the Reagan-Bush era moratorium on fetal tissue research.94
Five months later, the Clinton-aligned Congress passed the National
Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 (“NIHRA”).95 The
NIHRA revoked the 1975 regulation that had prohibited the NIH from
funding any embryo and fetal tissue research project unless an EAB
approved the project.96 Even though this regulation remained effective
throughout the Reagan-Bush Administrations, neither President had
formed an EAB to approve fetal tissue and embryo research during their
terms.97

90. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM
WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE 251-52 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2005) (describing President
Bush’s 1992 reelection campaign strategy where he ran on a platform that “called for the
restoration of prayer in the public schools, and denounced abortion” to appeal to religiously
conservative voters).
91. Id.
92. Robertson, supra note 1, at 194.
93. See Kiessling, supra note 15, at 1074 (discussing the enactment of the NIHRA); see
also Robertson, supra note 1, at 194 (discussing the enactment of the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment).
94. Vawter, supra note 30, at 83 (explaining how President Clinton had made a campaign
promise to end the moratorium).
95. KIRSTIN R.W. MATTHEWS & ERIN H. YANG, POLITICS AND POLICIES GUIDING
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES 15-17
(2019),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/a9096889/chb-pub-greenwall-hesc011519.pdf.
96. Id.
97. See supra Parts II.B-C; see also MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 13-14
(explaining how the Reagan-Bush Administrations pursued efforts to establish an EAB in
1985, but never took any action to officially form one).
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The revocation of the 1975 regulation paved the way for the NIH
to finally approve funding for fetal tissue and embryo research by
removing ethics board oversight.98 Following the revocation, President
Clinton ordered his newly appointed NIH Director, Harold Varmus, to
develop guidelines for embryo research.99 Director Harold Varmus
formed the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel (“HERP”) to establish
the guidelines and released its conclusions in 1994.100 The HERP’s
conclusions recommended that certain instances of embryo research
should receive federal funding.101
Controversially, HERP also
recommended that federal funding should go to projects that created
embryos solely for research purposes.102
In a surprising response, President Clinton issued a presidential
directive prohibiting the NIH from funding projects that created an
embryo for research purposes.103 President Clinton qualified his
decision by stating that moral and ethical considerations weighed against
funding such projects.104 However, some commentators believe that
political factors also played a part in his decision.105 The 1994 Congress
had become much more conservative, and the directive could help him
politically by silencing his political opponents on the issue of embryo
research.106
Regardless of President Clinton’s reasoning, Congress did not
believe the presidential directive did enough and began working on
legislation to establish more stringent controls over embryo research.107
This legislation would become known as the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment and establish two quintessential aspects of the United
States’ stem cell research policy.108 Passed as part of the appropriations

98. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 15.
99. Robertson, supra note 1, at 194. President Clinton had actually ordered Varmus to
begin developing the guidelines in 1992, before President Clinton assumed office. See id.
President Clinton likely ordered Varmus to develop these guidelines in order to make good
on his campaign promise to end the fetal tissue research moratorium and to support the
advancement of the field. See Vawter, supra note 30, at 83.
100. Robertson, supra note 1, at 194.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Kiessling, supra note 15, at 1077.
104. Id.
105. John C. Fletcher, U.S. Public Policy on Embryo Research: Two Steps Forward, One
Large Step Back, 10 HUM. REPROD. 1875, 1877 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Nefi D. Acosta & Sidney H. Golub, The New Federalism: State Policies Regarding
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 419, 420 (2016).
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bill for the HHS, the relevant portions of the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment provided that:
(a) None of the funds made available [in this Act] may be used for
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research
purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death
greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero . . . .
(b) For purposes of this section, the term “human embryo or
embryos” shall include any organism, not protected as a human
subject . . . that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning,
or any other means from one or more human gametes.109

The Dickey-Wicker Amendment had two immediate effects.110
First, it prohibited the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) from
providing federal funding for research that resulted in the destruction of
a human embryo.111 Second, it prohibited the NIH from issuing federal
funds for research that involved creating a human embryo for research
purposes.112 In 1996, President Clinton signed the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment into law.113 The Amendment, which Congress has renewed
every year since 1996, continues to curtail embryo research by codifying
prohibitions on funding from all agencies within the HHS.114
In 1998, the Clinton Administration would oversee another critical
event in the development of the United States’ stem cell policy: the
isolation of human embryonic stem cells.115 Dr. James Thomson had
discovered the method of isolating human embryonic stem cells at the
University of Wisconsin by splitting five and six-day-old, fertilized
eggs.116 Since the Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibited the federal
funding of Dr. Thomson’s discovery, the Geron Corporation had
financed the discovery.117 The news of Dr. Thomson’s work had two
effects. First, it directly linked stem cell research to embryonic and fetal

109. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996).
110. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 8.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 17. The prohibition was once again renewed in a recent omnibus spending bill
on March 15, 2022, and remains effective as of August 2022. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 737, 136 Stat. 94 (2022).
115. Robertson, supra note 1, at 192.
116. Id.; MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 17.
117. See Michael Mintrom, Competitive Federalism and the Governance of Controversial
Science, 39 PUBLIUS 606, 608 (2009).
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tissue research.118 Up until the isolation of human embryonic stem cells,
the public and the government had not actually addressed human
embryonic stem cells.119 Dr. Thomson’s discovery would finally ignite
the discussion of regulating human embryonic stem cell research as a
distinct yet related field to fetal tissue and embryo research.120
Second, the isolation of human embryonic stem cells raised the
question of whether the government should become an active participant
in the research and discovery of new human embryonic stem cell lines.121
Some policymakers expressed concern over the isolation of human
embryonic stem cells because it involved separating five and six-day-old
fertilized eggs.122 Others believed that the discovery could lead to new
medical therapies and advocated for the federal government to begin
funding human embryonic stem cells research that used embryos left
over from in-vitro fertilization treatments.123
The Clinton
Administration sided with the latter group and eventually issued a series
of research funding guidelines through the NIH in 2000.124 However,
because human embryonic stem cells involved the destruction of human
embryos, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibited the Clinton
Administration from using their funding guidelines for any embryo
research projects.125
E. 2000-2008: President George W. Bush and the Decentralized
“Compromise” Policy
While President Clinton had initially indicated an interest in
promoting stem cell research, he ultimately decided to withhold federal
funding for stem cell research due to political pressure and the passage
of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.126 Following Clinton’s two terms,
the United States’ stem cell policy would fall into the hands of President
George W. Bush (“President Bush Jr.”).127 Unlike his predecessor,

118. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 17.
119. See id.
120. See Allen M. Spiegel, The Stem Cell Wars: A Dispatch from the Front, 124
TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 94, 101 (2013) (describing how
the Clinton Administration issued the first series of guidelines regulating human embryonic
stem cell research).
121. See MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 17-18 (discussing the different views of
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and the Human Embryo Research Panel on
funding the creation of new stem cell lines).
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id.
124. Spiegel, supra note 120, at 101.
125. Id. at 100-01.
126. See supra Part II.D.
127. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18.
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George W. Bush had to handle both the country’s fetal tissue and embryo
research issues and the new issue of human embryonic stem cell
research.128 Although President Bush Jr. assumed office on a platform
opposed to both human embryo and human embryonic stem cell
research, he would end up taking on a more conciliatory approach to
funding human embryonic stem cell research.129 The Bush Jr.
Administration’s stem cell policies would encompass two key events:
the oral directive for a “compromise” policy130 and the founding of state
funding programs for stem cell research.131
On August 9, 2001, President Bush Jr. announced his human
embryo and embryonic stem cell research policy in an oral directive read
during a televised address to the country.132 Instead of banning all
human embryonic stem cell research funding, President Bush Jr.
declared that he would pursue a “compromise” policy that only
permitted federal funding for hESC research conducted on twenty-one
hESC lines that had already been created before August 9, 2001.133 The
President would also allow private or nonfederal funding of the research
areas without oversight or regulation, essentially continuing the policy
of previous administrations that did not restrict the private sector or
states from investing in fetal and embryo research.134
Although President Bush Jr. permitted embryonic stem cell
research funding, the policy still did not satisfy embryonic stem cell
research supporters for two reasons.135 First, supporters believed that
limits on funding would discourage new and established scientists from
entering the stem cell research field.136 Several private investors had
already patented methods for creating certain stem cell lines.137 If stem
cell researchers could not obtain federal funding to develop workarounds
to these patented methods, they would have to obtain licenses from
private investors to conduct their research.138 Supporters believed that

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Press Release, George W. Bush, President, President Discusses Stem Cell Research
(Aug. 9, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/
20010809-2.html [hereinafter Bush Press Release].
131. Mintrom, supra note 117, at 617-19.
132. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18; see Bush Press Release, supra note 130.
133. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18; see Bush Press Release, supra note 130.
134. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18.
135. Id.
136. See Jeanne Loring, A Patent Challenge for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
NATURE REP. STEM CELLS (2007), https://doi.org/10.1038/stemcells.2007.113.
137. Id. (discussing how Geron and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation had
already obtained patents for several stem cell lines and the methods for creating them).
138. Id.
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this financial burden would dissuade researchers from entering the field
and hinder scientific progress.139
Second, the restriction on funding for embryo research and the
creation of new stem cell lines limited research prospects.140 Since the
existing stem cell lines came from only a few donors, the stem cell lines
did not have genetic or ethnic diversity.141 Therefore, restricting
research to the existing lines would make it impossible to study how
specific diseases develop in different ethnicities and minority groups.142
Additionally, supporters believed that the then-existing stem cell lines
could die out because the stem cell lines could become genetically
unstable.143
In reaction to the restraints of the Bush Jr. policy, several states
began to push for state-funded stem cell research programs.144 New
Jersey and California were the leading states in the state stem cell
revolution.145 While New Jersey became the first state to pass legislation
that incentivized stem cell research, California became the first state to
provide funding for the field.146
In November 2004, California voters passed Proposition 71 to issue
a three billion dollar bond measure to establish the California Institute
for Regenerative Medicine (“CIRM”) to oversee and fund stem cell
research projects.147 In addition, the Proposition amended the state
constitution to make stem cell research a constitutional right.148
California’s approach quickly inspired other states to follow suit.149
Following the establishment of CIRM, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Maryland, and several other states would also set up state agencies to
fund stem cell research.150
These state agencies would become the bedrock for the United
States’ stem cell research efforts during President Bush Jr.’s time in
office.151 Like his predecessors, President Bush Jr. used his veto power

139. See id.
140. Spiegel, supra note 120, at 104.
141. Varnee Murugan, Embryonic Stem Cell Research: A Decade of Debate from Bush to
Obama, 82 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 101, 101 (2009).
142. Id.
143. Spiegel, supra note 120, at 104.
144. Acosta & Golub, supra note 108, at 420-22.
145. Id. at 426-27.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 423.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 426.
150. Acosta & Golub, supra note 108, at 426-27.
151. See Mintrom, supra note 117, at 614.
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to control the United States’ stem cell policy.152 In 2006 and 2007,
President Bush Jr. vetoed bipartisan bills that would expand the set of
human embryonic stem cell lines eligible for federally funded
research.153 However, President Bush Jr. took no further action to
nationally regulate stem cell research.154 The effect of President Bush
Jr.’s decentralized approach ultimately invited states to fill the stem cell
regulatory gap and has become credited for the rise of state-sponsored
stem cell programs.155
F. 2008-2016: President Obama and The Stem Cell Policy Shift
In 2009, President Obama assumed office and quickly did away
with President Bush Jr.’s decentralized stem cell research policy.156 In
place of his predecessor’s policy, President Obama attempted to pursue
a policy that promoted and controlled stem cell research.157 However,
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment’s prohibitions required President
Obama to employ more executive branch judo to open federal funding
for hESC research.
President Obama began enacting his stem cell policy by issuing an
executive order that instructed the NIH to “support and conduct
responsible, scientifically worthy human stem cell research, including
human embryonic stem cell research.”158 The order marked a turning
point for the nation’s stem cell research policy in two ways. First, it
effectively removed the Bush II-era policy restrictions on funding for
research on hESC lines created after August 9, 2001. 159 Second, it
caused the NIH to reinterpret the Dickey-Wicker Amendment as
permitting an expanded funding policy for hESC research.160
These departures from previous administrations relied on the NIH’s
new belief that not all hESC research resulted in the destruction of a
human.161 While the NIH continued to acknowledge that hESC research
aimed at deriving new hESC lines involved the destruction of human

152. Id. at 613.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 5.
157. Id. at 18-19 (describing the various pro-stem cell research policies that the Obama
Administration pursued).
158. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667, 10667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
159. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18.
160. Id. at 19.
161. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“In the 2009 Guidelines
the NIH expressly distinguished between the derivation of ESCs and ‘research involving
[ESCs] that does not involve an embryo nor result in an embryo’s destruction.’ ” ).
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embryos,162 a substantial amount of hESC research merely involved the
use of hESC lines to study areas such as disease pathology.163 Since
some kinds of hESC research utilized established hESC lines and did not
directly result in the destruction of a human embryo, the NIH believed
that it could legally provide federal funding for the projects in
accordance with the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.164
Based on this new view of hESC research, the NIH created new
guidelines for disbursing federal funds for stem cell research in the
United States. The new guidelines of the Obama Administration still
prohibited funding for the creation of new hESC lines.165 But, it opened
up federal funding for research that used new hESC lines created after
August 9, 2001 if the hESC lines had been derived from privately funded
human embryo research.166 Many scientists, biotech companies, and
political figures saw these efforts as a positive sign that the United States
would finally have a stem cell policy that separated science from
politics.167 Despite this praise, the Obama Administration would
ultimately need to justify its pro-stem cell research policy decisions in
court.168
In Sherley v. Sebelius, two stem cell researchers James Sherley and
Theresa Deisher, joined with other anti-human embryonic stem cell
groups to contest the Obama Administration’s new NIH guidelines for
funding stem cell research.169 According to the plaintiffs, the new NIH
guidelines that permitted federal funding for human embryonic stem cell
research clearly violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment because any
human embryonic stem cells must have come from the destruction of an
embryo.170 However, since the Dickey-Wicker Amendment did not

162. See id. at 95.
163. See id.
164. Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2011). (“The NIH seems
reasonably to have concluded that, although Dickey–Wicker bars funding for the destructive
act of deriving an ESC from an embryo, it does not prohibit funding a research project in
which an ESC will be used.”).
165. See Murugan, supra note 141, at 102.
166. Id. at 101-02.
167. Howard Wolinsky, The Pendulum Swung: President Barack Obama Removes
Restrictions on Stem-Cell Research, but Are Expectations Now Too High?, 10 EMBO REP.
436, 437 (2009). John Kessler, Professor of Neurology and Director of the Feinberg
Neuroscience Institute at Northwestern University, commented on the new Obama policy by
stating that “[i]t’s nice to see politics are no longer intervening in science, where they never
should have been in the first place.” Id.
168. Sherley v. Sebelius, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
169. Id. at 8.
170. Id. at 17.
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expressly state that human embryonic stem cell research qualified as
research that resulted in the destruction of human embryos, the Court
deferred to the NIH’s interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment
as not encompassing human embryonic stem cell research.171 Although
the plaintiffs appealed the ruling, they lost the case, and the Supreme
Court refused to grant their petition for writ of certiorari.172
The Obama Administration’s victory allowed it to follow through
on its plans to fund human embryonic stem cell research. However, the
favorable ruling also showed how stem cell research funding policies
stood on precarious footing. If a President could simply open federal
funding for stem cell research through executive order, they could just
as quickly cut off funding at any time.
G. 2016-2020: President Trump and The Status Quo
Throughout most of President Trump’s term in office, the federal
government did not take any concrete action on the issue of human
embryonic stem cell research.173 However, in June 2019, the Trump
Administration suddenly announced that it would order the HHS to
subject research projects that used fetal tissue to additional scrutiny and
potentially restrict their funding.174 Although the order targeted fetal
tissue rather than embryonic stem cells, the decision troubled many
researchers who study how to make organ replacements from stem
cells.175 In this research, fetal tissue is a reference for how well the stem
cell-generated proto-organs replicate natural human tissue.176 By
imposing funding restrictions on projects that involved fetal tissue, the
Trump Administration threatened to hamper stem cell research
inadvertently.177
However, with the departure of the Trump
Administration and the inauguration of President Biden, these
regulations may very well come to an end.

171. Id. at 19 (applying the Chevron standard to interpret the NIH’s interpretation of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (articulating the standard for judicial review of an agency’s
interpretation of a statute).
172. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1087
(2013).
173. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 19.
174. See Sara Reardon, U.S. Government Curtails Fetal-Tissue Research, 570 NATURE
148, 148 (2019), https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-019-017836/d41586-019-01783-6.pdf.
175. Id. (discussing how a researcher, Dr. Andrew McMahon, utilizes fetal tissue to
determine how closely his lab’s stem cell derived kidney reflects real human tissue).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The last several decades show that the United States has a
fragmented policymaking system for governing controversial sciences
like stem cell research.178 The fragmented system has risen from
Congress’ inability to make legislation that effectively controls stem cell
research while also balancing the ethical concerns of legislators and their
constituents.179 As a result, presidents can use executive orders or
directives to exercise unfettered control over the United States’ stem cell
research and exploit Congress’s policy gaps.180
IV. ANALYSIS
The president’s influence over stem cell research through executive
branch judo poses a significant problem for the United States because it
makes the federal stem cell research policy too inconsistent and
variable.181 The numerous changes to the nation’s stem cell research
policies over the last forty years show how presidents can have
drastically different views on stem cell research.182 Given their degree
of control over executive agencies that fund research, presidents can
exploit weak congressional legislation and shape the progress of stem
cell research to suit their political or personal beliefs.183 The
unpredictability of this unilateral policymaking system has
disincentivized stem cell research and contributed to a disorganized
regulatory framework for emerging stem cell therapeutics.184
This section will focus on whether presidents can validly use
executive orders and directives to establish federal stem cell research
policies and discuss the effects of this policymaking system.185 First, it

178. See James W. Fossett et al., Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism,
37 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 24, 24-25 (2007).
179. Id. at 25.
180. Yaniv Heled, On Presidents, Agencies, and the Stem Cells Between Them: A Legal
Analysis of President Bush’s and the Federal Government’s Policy on the Funding of
Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 90 (2008).
181. Fossett et al., supra note 178, at 25.
182. Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by the Three Branches of
Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
BIOMEDICINE, 335, 351 (1995).
183. Id.
184. See Jeffrey L. Furman et al., Growing Stem Cells: The Impact of Federal Funding
Policy on the U.S. Scientific Frontier, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 661, 700 (2012)
(discussing how lower research paper publications during the early years of President George
W. Bush’s Administration indicates that uncertainty disincentivizes research); see also
MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 7 (discussing how the states have largely had to
regulate stem cell research due to the lack of federal guidance).
185. Heled, supra note 180, at 106.
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will utilize Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure three-tier analysis to discuss
how the executive branch’s regulation of stem cell research verges on
the brink of executive lawmaking activity. It will then discuss how
permitting the president to make stem cell research policy has affected
research efforts and regulation of stem cell therapeutics.
A. Evaluating the President’s Authority to Make Stem Cell Research
Policies
Over the last few decades, presidents have used executive branch
judo—in the form of directives, vetoes, or executive orders—to establish
drastically different stem cell research policies.186 This raises an
interesting question: to what degree did presidents have the authority to
control stem cell research policies?
A president’s authority to act arguably stems from the Take Care
Clause of the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court has construed
the Clause as placing a strict obligation on the president and their
delegates to comply with and execute the statutory directives of
Congress,187 some lower courts have construed the Clause as providing
these parties with broad discretion to enforce the law.188 Nevertheless, a
president must “take Care that the Law[] be faithfully executed” once a
bill has become law.189 If a president disregards, amends, or repeals
statutory directives from Congress, the president violates the separation
of powers because he or she is substituting their own policy choices for
those established by Congress.190 In effect, this would permit the
president to go beyond their limited lawmaking power to recommend
legislation to Congress,191 communicate their opposition or support for

186. See supra Parts II.A-G (describing the various directives and executive orders that
Presidents have used to control research in controversial areas of science).
187. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The duty
of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”).
188. This is particularly evident in cases where the President’s discretion to prosecute
criminal cases is at issue. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir.
1967) (“The President of the United States is charged in Article 2, Section 3, of the
Constitution with the duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .’ . . . The
discretion . . . in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a
prosecution already started, is absolute.”).
189. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
190. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (“To
contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed,
implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and
entirely inadmissible.”).
191. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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legislation under consideration,192 and sign legislation that meets their
approval or veto legislation that they disagree with.193
Based on these principles of presidential authority, the regulation
of stem cell research by recent presidents seemed to fall outside of
presidential authority because all recent presidents have deviated from
the confines of Congressional legislation or ignored it entirely.
Furthermore, Congress has never granted the president express authority
to regulate controversial sciences such as stem cell research.194 This
suggests that the stem cell “policymaking” of last several presidents may
have constituted impermissible lawmaking activity that exceeded
presidential authority and the law.195
Justice Jackson provides the essential source of guidance for
determining whether a president has utilized their executive power in a
permissible manner.196 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
(Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Jackson articulated three
“tiers” where the president has the authority to act.197 The first tier
encompasses presidential acts that Congress has expressly or impliedly
authorized.198 In these situations, the president has acted with maximum
authority and on sound constitutional footing.199 The second tier
encompasses presidential acts that fall within a “zone of twilight” where
Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited the president’s actions.200
If a president operates within the “zone of twilight,” the president’s
independent power to act depends on the “imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”201
Pursuant to this guiding principle, “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence” to a president’s independent actions may implicitly
authorize the president’s actions.202 The third and final tier encompasses
presidential acts that expressly or impliedly contravene Congress’

192. Id. art. I, § 7.
193. Id.
194. See Heled, supra note 180, at 106.
195. See id. at 106.
196. Id. at 90-91.
197. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 635.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 637.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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will.203 In this last tier, the president’s authority to act stands on the
weakest legal footing.204
Applying Justice Jackson’s tier analysis to policymaking in
controversial science research indicates that presidents do not have a
solid constitutional basis to control stem cell research.205 Several
presidents actively worked to consolidate executive authority over stem
cell research by leveraging their executive power in a manner that
essentially amounted to lawmaking.206 In addition, presidents have
frequently used directives to immunize their actions from judicial
review.207 The following sections will address why past presidents have
not had the clear authority to control stem cell-related research.
1. President Reagan
The Reagan Administration’s approach to controlling controversial
areas of science likely constituted a permissible exercise of presidential
authority within Justice Jackson’s second tier of authority. During his
administration, President Reagan pursued a policy that opposed fetal
tissue research on tissue from elective abortions.208 Since no law
required or prohibited the Reagan Administration from supporting these
research projects,209 the Reagan Administration operated in the “zone of
twilight” when it imposed the moratorium on fetal tissue research.210
While the moratorium did not directly infringe upon Congress’ express
or implied will, it also lacked a solid legal basis because Congress had
not expressly granted the Reagan Administration the authority to create
the policy.211
Nevertheless, President Reagan’s moratorium was likely
permissible under the Take Care Clause. Justice Jackson’s approach
suggested that congressional “indifference or quiescence” to Presidential
action could indicate implicit authorization of a President’s actions by

203. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637.
204. Id.
205. Heled, supra note 180, at 124 (arguing that at least President George W. Bush did
not have a constitutional basis to pursue the compromise policy).
206. See supra Parts II.C, II.E (discussing how the Bush Administrations vetoed bipartisan
legislation that went against their political stances on stem cell research); see also Heled,
supra note 180, at 87 (describing how President George W. Bush vetoed bipartisan legislation
that would curtail his control over stem cell research in 2006 and 2007).
207. Heled, supra note 180, at 88-89.
208. See Charo, supra note 26, at 481.
209. Id.
210. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952).
211. See id.
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Congress.212
As Congress did not oppose President Reagan’s
mortarium, it may have concluded that the President’s actions were
permissible with Congress’ aims. Regardless of whether Congress
actually authorized the Reagan Administration’s actions, the Reagan-era
did establish a clear precedent: presidents could pursue their own stem
cell research policy objectives in the absence of clear legislation.
2. President George H. W. Bush
The first Bush Administration’s approach to regulating fetal and
embryonic research likely fell within Justice Jackson’s third tier of
authority because President Bush Sr. went outside of the confines of his
presidential authority. During his term, President Bush Sr. pursued an
anti-embryo and fetal tissue research policy that clashed with Congress’
desire to adopt a more supportive policy.213 In pursuing his policy
objectives, President Bush Sr. directed the NIH to extend the moratorium
on fetal tissue research against the protests of the Congressional
majority, utilized “diverting” executive orders to breakdown
bipartisanship, and vetoed any legislation that would constrain his ability
to unilaterally decide embryo and fetal tissue research policy.214 As
discussed above, the extension may have constituted an illegal exercise
of executive power because it ignored the restraints on the duration of
the moratorium, as well as the proper procedures to enact it.
The Windom moratorium was set to expire when President Bush
Sr. assumed office.215 The procedures for rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act should have required the Bush Sr.
Administration to publish a proposed extension of the moratorium in the
Federal Register and field public comment on the proposal before
executing an extension.216 However, Sullivan simply announced that the
ban would continue indefinitely.217 This meant that the Bush Sr.
Administration ignored the Congressional directives for the proper
execution of the moratorium and engaged in impermissible lawmaking
activity by amending a law to increase its effective duration. These
actions indicate that President Bush Sr. went against the implied will and

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id.
Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 83.
Id.
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express will of Congress, which likely places his actions within Justice
Jackson’s third tier of authority as unconstitutional lawmaking.218
3. President Clinton
Like his predecessor, President Clinton’s regulation of embryo and
fetal tissue research likely fell within Justice Jackson’s third tier of
authority as well. President Clinton had initially voiced an intention to
support embryo and fetal tissue research during his presidency, but he
ultimately adopted a moderate approach that retained certain restrictions
on funding stem cell research projects.219 The issue with this moderate
approach was that President Clinton accomplished it by blatantly
contravening the express will of Congress.220
According to Youngstown, presidential actions contravene the will
of Congress when the actions are incompatible with statutory
instructions and fall outside of the President’s inherent authority.221 In
the context of President Clinton’s administration, the statutory
instructions of the NIHRA prevented the NIH from withholding federal
funds for ethical reasons unless the NIH had the support of an ethics
advisory board.222 However, when the advisory board recommended
President Clinton’s NIH to provide funding for essentially all forms of
embryo research,223 President Clinton disregarded the board’s decision
and immediately issued an oral directive that commanded the NIH to
withhold funds for research that would create human embryos
specifically for research.224

218. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637-38
(1952).
219. See MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 14-18 (discussing how President Clinton
issued a “series of orders” that included lifting the ban on federal funding of fetal tissue
research, but prohibited federal funding for creating embryos for research purposes).
220. See Heled, supra note 180, at 119 n.292 (explaining how President Clinton’s socalled “Embryo Decision” ran “in clear violation of the NIHRA.”) .
221. Heled, supra note 180, at 75.
222. Id. at 74-75 (“[t]he NIHRA explicitly. . .imposed restrictions on the HHS’s ability to
withhold funds for research on ethical grounds so that such a withholding could not take place
without the recommendation of an independent [Ethics Advisory Board].”); 42 U.S.C. § 289a1(b) (2018).
223. Heled, supra note 180, at 75.
224. Kayla Dunn, The Politics of Stem Cells (April 13, 2005),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/dispatches/050413.html (“President Clinton
rejected part of these recommendations and directed the NIH not to allocate funds to
experiments that would create new embryos specifically for research.”); see also id.
(discussing how President Clinton issued the directive the day after the advisory board had
recommended the NIH to expand funding for embryo research).
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The issuance of the oral directive constituted a clear violation of the
NIHRA’s statutory instructions.225 The NIHRA only permitted the NIH
to withhold funds for embryo research if it had the support of an ethics
advisory board.226 Since the ethics advisory board had not counseled
against funding research that would create embryos, the NIHRA should
not have allowed President Clinton to withhold the funding. In this
regard, Clinton followed the example of his predecessor by actively
going against Congress’ will by violating statutory instructions and
engaging in unconstitutional lawmaking for federal research policies.227
4. President George W. Bush
Like the two previous administrations, the Bush Jr.
Administration’s actions also fall within Justice Jackson’s third tier of
authority. Like Clinton, President Bush Jr. utilized a directive to prohibit
the NIH from funding certain embryo and embryonic stem cell research
projects without relying on the recommendation of an EAB.228
Curiously, President Bush Jr. chose to issue his compromise policy
directive orally during a televised event.229 The directive was neither
memorialized nor published in any formal government publication.230
Due to these characteristics, the directive did not meet the criteria for
any known category of a presidential directive.231 This interesting
choice of action meant that the directive was effectively unreachable by
judicial review because courts could not throw out the directive for any
procedural or formal flaws.232 Since nothing has made these types of

225. Heled, supra note 180, at 119 n.292.
226. Heled, supra note 180, at 74-75.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 89
229. Heled, supra note 180, at 89. It is also interesting to note that President Clinton also
issued his so-called “Embryo Decision” as an oral executive order, much like his successor,
President Bush Jr. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 89-90. Unlike an executive order or proclamation, President Bush’s directive
also lacked any specific instructions to executive officers and did not bear the conventional
titles that would help classify it as one of the generally known forms of presidential directives.
Id. at 89; see also Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (June 21, 1962) (describing the
general requirements for issuing executive orders and proclamations).
232. See id. at 88-89 (explaining how Presidents can avoid the questions about the legality
of a directive by tailoring them to not fit within the definition of either an executive order or
proclamation). Executive orders and proclamations must be published in the federal registrar
and must “contain a citation of the authority under which [they are issued].” Exec. Order No.
11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (June 21, 1962). Therefore, by issuing a directive that does not
qualify as an executive order or proclamation, Presidents can “avoid having to state the
[d]irective’s source of authority, which might cast its legal legitimacy in a questionable light.”
Heled, supra note 180, at 89 n.139.
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directives illegal, presidents can potentially use similar methods to
control stem cell research policies in the future unilaterally.
5. President Obama
The Obama Administration’s actions likely fall within Justice
Jackson’s first or second tier of authority. Obama’s executive order that
permitted the NIH to fund human embryonic stem cell research observed
all the formalities of the NIHRA because it required the NIH to subject
research proposals to a strict ethical review.233 On the other hand, the
Obama Administration’s interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment clearly clashed with the Amendment’s intended purpose of
restricting funds for hESC research. If viewed in isolation, this would
likely place President Obama’s actions within the “zone of twilight”
because it was neither authorized nor expressly denied by the DickeyWicker Amendment.234 However, the Obama Administration’s actions
would ultimately attain credibility due to the favorable judgment in
Sherley.235 This makes it difficult to accurately categorize the Obama
Administration’s stem cell policy actions under Justice Jackson’s
approach.
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration’s actions still raised some
concerns regarding the future of stem cell research in the United States.
As seen in Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012), which
ruled in favor of the Obama Administration, courts will defer to the
NIH’s interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment when deciding
on whether to extend funding to stem cell research projects.236 This
implies that future presidents could cut off stem cell research funding by
simply stacking the NIH with stem cell research opponents. Through
these agents, the president could easily influence the NIH to interpret the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment as prohibiting the funding of stem cell
research. Therefore, the Obama Administration did not help establish a
more consistent framework for stem cell policymaking.
6. President Trump
President Trump’s efforts to establish a more rigorous review of
fetal tissue project funding in 2019 likely falls within Justice Jackson’s

233. MATTHEWS & YANG, supra note 95, at 18-19.
234. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
235. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s
deferral to the agency interpretation), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1087 (2013).
236. See id. (describing how the court deferred to the NIH interpretation of the DickeyWicker Amendment and President Obama’s Executive Order 13,505).
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second tier of authority. While the NIHRA does permit the executive
branch to establish ethics review boards for NIH research proposals,237
the Trump Administration’s directive appears to impose an undue
burden on the approval of fetal tissue research. Under the Trump
directive, ethics review of NIH proposals could last up to six months.238
The increased approval time creates an obstacle for many stem cell
scientists who rely on fetal tissue for their research.239 Therefore, the
Trump Administration’s directive likely falls within Justice Jackson’s
second tier of authority because it hampers Congress’ intent to make
NIH funding more accessible in a statutorily permissible manner.240
B. The Effects of President’s Policymaking Authority Over Stem Cell
Research
The analysis of presidential actions to control stem cell research
shows that almost all presidents have acted outside the scope of their
authority to some degree. Even if Congress tries to pass a statute to
curtail the president’s control over federal research policies, presidents
can simply use their veto power to block the legislation as President
Bush Sr. did during his term.241 Permitting the executive branch to
control the United States’ stem cell research policy unilaterally has
affected stem cell research in three ways.
1. Discouraging Research and Development
Uncertain federal support from the executive branch undoubtedly
affects research progress and development.242 As an initial matter, the
lack of steady funding can deter students from investing themselves in
stem cell research.243 The lack of federal support also makes investment
in stem cell research facilities and faculty much more expensive for
universities.244 While stem cell researchers can turn to either state

237. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b) (2018).
238. Jocelyn Kaiser & Meredith Wadman, Trump administration releases details on fetal
tissue restrictions, SCIENCE (July 26, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07
/trump-administration-releases-details-fetal-tissue-restrictions.
239. See id.
240. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952).
241. Vawter, supra note 30, at 82-83.
242. See Furman et al., supra note 184.
243. See J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Jason Scott Robert, Stem Cells, Science, and Public
Reasoning, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 707, 709 (2012).
244. Federal funding provides “more than half of the total amount U.S. universities and
colleges spend on R&D each year.” Laurie A. Harris & Marcy E. Gallo, Cong. Research Serv.,
R44774, Federally Funded Academic Research Requirements: Background and Issues in
Brief 1 (2017), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44774.pdf; see generally Acosta & Golub, supra
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funding agencies or private investors for financial backing, both of these
options have drawbacks.245
Certain states, like California and
Massachusetts, may currently provide state funding for stem cell
research.246 However, these funding agencies rely on bonds from state
voters.247 Therefore, state agencies cannot guarantee consistent funding
because state voters may one day decide that stem cell research is not
worth the costs.248
Additionally, private investors do not provide a meaningful
alternative either. First, investors typically do not invest in early-stage
sciences like hESC research because it is generally “too far upstream
from marketable products.”249 As investors are uncertain of whether their
funding will lead to a marketable product, they have less of an incentive
to invest in the research.250 Second, private investors view stem cell
research as a risky venture.251 This stems from the fact that stem cell
technology companies face the chronic risk of becoming banned by
executive policy actions.252 The uncertainty of this system discourages
scientists from pursuing stem cell research.253

note 108, at 419-20 (discussing the difficulty of conducting university research on stem cells
with and without federal funding restrictions).
245. Mintrom, supra note 117, at 617; see Acosta & Golub, supra note 108, at 420-21.
Some states have found it difficult to provide continuous state funding for stem cell research
because their citizens do not always want to vote for more government spending. Id.; see also
Robertson, supra note 1, at 194 (discussing reluctance from private investors to support
research efforts because hESC is generally “too far upstream from marketable products.”).
246. Id. at 429-27.
247. Id. at 423. The California state funding agency relied on funds generated by the sale
of general obligation bonds, which the state would repay with revenue primarily derived from
“state personal and corporate income taxes and the sales tax.” Secretary of State, 2004 Official
Voter Information Guide 69 (2004), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2004/general/english.pdf.
248. Mintrom, supra note 117, at 617. In 2005, New Jersey became one of the first states
to fund stem cell research. In 2007, however, New Jersey voters refused to support a ballot
initiative that would have issued $450 million in state bonds to further support stem cell
research. The failure of the 2007 New Jersey ballot initiative has largely been attributed to
“voter reluctance to see their state, already heavily indebted, initiate yet another bond issue.”
Id. at 618. At the time of the ballot initiative, New Jersey was $30 billion in debt. New Jersey
Rebuffs Loan to Fund Stem-Cell Research, 450 NATURE 332, 332 (2007),
https://www.nature.com/articles/450332a.pdf.
249. Robertson, supra note 1, at 194.
250. Id.
251. See Amanda Warren-Jones, Realising New Health Technologies: Problems of
Regulating Human Stem Cells in the USA, 20 MED. L. REV. 1, 571 (2012).
252. See id.
253. See id.
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2. Contribution to Patent Monopolies
A lack of federal funding initiatives from the executive branch can
also lead to patent monopolies. Just five months before the Bush policy
announcement, Dr. Thomson successfully obtained a patent for his 1998
discovery of isolating human embryonic stem cells.254 Later that year,
Dr. Thomson assigned the rights to the patent to the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation. Geron obtained an exclusive license to the patent
to create several major stem cell lines and commercialize the discovery
through the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.255
Through Dr. Thomson’s work, Geron and the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation would create several major stem cell lines and
license their use to researchers.256 However, the license required
researchers to grant Geron and the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation the rights to any discovery that came from using the stem
cell lines. This licensing structure created problems for researchers in
the Bush policy. If it became effective, the policy would financially
inhibit scientists from working around the Geron and the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation by creating new stem cell lines.257 In
effect, the Bush policy would force scientists to license stem cell lines
from Geron or the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, which few
scientists wanted to do because their inventions would all belong to
Geron or the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.258
Future restrictions on stem cell research funding could recreate this
dilemma. As of now, no law prohibits an incoming President from
reinstituting the Bush-era policies regarding what stem cell lines can
receive federal funding. If the United States wants to avoid patent
monopolies that kill innovation and competition, it must establish a
consistent funding protocol for the derivation and creation of new stem
cell lines.
3. Unpredictability Contributes to a Disorganized Regulatory
Framework for Stem Cell Discoveries and Therapeutics
Due to the everchanging executive policies for stem cell research,
many states and private entities have had to fill in policy gaps to regulate

254. Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998)
(issued Mar. 13, 2001).
255. See Loring, supra note 136.
256. Id.
257. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patent on Human Stem Cell Puts U.S. Officials in Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at A1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
2001/08/17/745014.html?pageNumber=1.
258. Id.
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the development of stem cell therapies.259 This has two significant
disadvantages. First, the results of the research may not become publicly
disclosed or available for peer review.260 This can lead to unnecessary
duplications of research and the publication of unsubstantiated claims
that stem cell research has developed some miracle therapy.261 In fact,
some have even attributed the rise of underregulated stem cell clinics to
the lack of a centralized federal regulatory structure for stem cell
research.262Second, the current policymaking structure fails to involve
the public in discussions over stem cell research policies. Since the
executive branch typically appoints ethics committees to review stem
cell policies, they largely leave the public out of the policymaking
process. This creates a mismatch between the public’s expectation of
stem cell regulations and the government’s efforts to regulate the field.
V. PROPOSAL
The United States could pursue three courses of action to establish
a more consistent federal stem cell research policy. All three courses of
action aim to achieve the same goal: limiting the executive branch’s
influence over stem cell research policy.
A. Rewrite the Dickey-Wicker Amendment Clarify Federal Funding
Protocols
By spurring Congress to rewrite the Dickey-Wicker Amendment or
enact new legislation to clarify funding for stem cell research, the United
States could develop a better policymaking system for controversial
areas of scientific research. The executive branch has too much control
over stem cell research because of ambiguities surrounding research
funding statutes. Congress could fix this problem by creating more
detailed legislation that defines how scientists may conduct stem cell
research. Although this would be difficult because legislators have
different political and social views on stem cell research, clearer
legislation would be the most effective method of curtailing the
executive branch’s control over federal research policies.

259. Warren-Jones, supra note 251, at 565.
260. Id. at 555; Vawter, supra note 30, at 82.
261. Acosta & Golub, supra note 108, at 420-21.
262. The federal funding controversy has spurred some fervent supporters of hESC
research to “unrealistically raise expectations for the cures sure to come.” Spiegel, supra note
121, at 106. The fervor surrounding these unproven and unrealistic expectations have led to
a “proliferation of ‘charlatan’ stem cell clinics promising treatments for a multitude of
diseases, but in fact, using unproven and in many cases unsafe methods.” Id.
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B. Involve the Public in the Policymaking Process
Another way to address the United States’ stem cell policy issue
would be to establish a new category of state representatives and involve
them in the stem cell policymaking process.263 This approach would
have two benefits.
First, involving representatives from each state in the policymaking
process could make stem cell research and regulations more
transparent.264 Each state would choose its own representative to
represent their state’s interests in a permanent national committee.265
The committee would function as a public forum for the controversial
research policies, inform the American public about the nation’s
collective view of stem cell research, and provide the president with
suggested policy decisions. The president would not have to pursue the
committee’s policy suggestions. However, it would prevent the
president from hiding their unwillingness to serve the public interest and
potentially affect the president’s performance in reelection years.
Furthermore, electing laypersons as public representatives to the
national committee could also spur beneficial public discourse on stem
cell research.266 Evidence suggests that laypeople spend the bulk of their
time communicating with other laypeople.267 If laypeople join in the
policymaking process and have a positive experience, they are more
likely diffuse what they learn to the public, which can help promote a
greater trust in policymaking decisions.268 In effect, they would become
public representatives of stem cell policymaking decisions, increasing
the transparency of stem cell policy decisions, and influencing the
growth of grassroots groups that trust in the government’s ability to
regulate stem cell research properly.269
Second, involving state representatives and members of the public
in federal policymaking decisions would help create more well-rounded
federal stem cell policies.270 Many states already have experienced stem
cell regulators and administrators with experience in managing state

263. Myrisha S. Lewis, Innovating Federalism in the Life Sciences, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 383,
413 (2020).
264. Id. at 416.
265. Id.
266. Michael Mintrom & Rebecca Bollard, Governing Controversial Science: Lessons
from Stem Cell Research, 28 POL’Y & SOC’Y 301, 311 (2009).
267. Id. at 312.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. (“[t]he breaking down of barriers between members of the public and
members of the decision-making body can promote more open dialogue and the development
of trust. . ..increas[ing] the odds that good decisions will be made.”).
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funding agencies for stem cell research policymaking.271 If the federal
government wants to pursue a policy that genuinely reflects the stem cell
interests of the states, it should leverage the expertise of state
administrators and allow them to contribute to the national policymaking
process.272 This could either take the form of an independent advisory
board to executive agency that engage in decision making or
legislation.273 Either method would ensure that each state has some say
in the creation of federal stem cell policies.274
C. Establishing an Independent Commission for Research
Policymaking
The alternative course of action would be to establish an
independent research policy commission that mirrors the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”). Although presidents appoint the Commissioners
of the FTC, the president has limited influence over the five-member
Commission because of three reasons. First, the Senate must confirm
the president’s selections, which could potentially place a check on the
President’s ability to select an official that would pursue the President’s
policy interests.275 Second, the president would not have the power to
remove a commissioner because of political or policy differences.276
Third, the FTC restricts the influence of political parties because no more
than three commissioners can come from the same political party.277
Once appointed and confirmed, each commissioner serves seven-year
terms, which enables the FTC to maintain a more consistent policy
stance even when a new president assumes office.278

271. Mintrom & Bollard, supra note 266, at 312-13 (discussing how officials from the
California Institute of Regenerative Medicine could “become diffusers of incremental
improvements and innovations in regulatory compliance across the science system.”).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 485.
275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (West 2022) (“Any commissioner may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). The President may not
remove an FTC commissioner for any other reason. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that a President could not remove a FTC Commissioner
based on the belief that “the aims and purposes of the Administration. . .can be carried out
most effectively with personnel of my own selection.”); see generally Remarks of J. Thomas
Rosch, Thoughts on the FTC’s Relationship (Constitutional and Otherwise) to the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Branches 8 (Sept. 19, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/thoughts-ftcs-relationship-constitutional-and-otherwiselegislative-executive-and-judicial-branches/090919roschberlinspeech.pdf (discussing the
administrative framework after Humphrey’s Executor).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018).
278. Id.
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Modelling a stem cell research commission after the FTC could
potentially solve many of the current issues with federal stem cell
research funding policies. Like the FTC, this stem cell research
commission would follow a similar governance structure whereby the
commission would exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power
over stem cell research policies. In effect, the commission would assume
control over stem cell research and prevent presidents from changing the
nation’s policies each time they change office. By having a multimember commission, the president’s appointees would have less power
to enforce the president’s personal views or agendas. Furthermore, the
appointees could exercise more independent judgment because the
president would not have the power to remove the commissioners based
solely on political or policy differences.
VI. CONCLUSION
The way the executive branch has handled the stem cell research
policies must change for the United States to realize the benefits that
stem cell research can provide. With the inauguration of the forty-sixth
President of the United States and the start of the 118th United States
Congress, funding for stem cell research has become uncertain once
again. Hopefully, the new administration will help build a more
sustainable framework for future stem cell research.

